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Perking Up the Coffee Industry Through
Fair Trade
Jill Draeger"
INTRODUCTION
Many coffee farms around the world have been completely
abandoned and overgrown by weeds, with the coffee cherries left
to rot on the trees.1 The farmers who once cultivated these
farms took their families and established camps on roadsides 2 or
in city parks3 to beg for food and jobs. Some even journeyed to
capital cities to urge their governments to provide needed re-
lief.4 These families were forced to leave an industry and the
farms they had toiled on for generations.5 In stark contrast is
the television image created by Colombian Coffee of Juan Val-
dez, a jolly, plump coffee farmer standing next to his mule.6 The
reality is that even when there is an increase in the price of cof-
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2000, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison. Thank you to my friends and family for their support
and a special thank you to the wonderful editors and staff of the Minnesota Journal
of Global Trade.
1. Elizabeth Neuffer, The Shadow of Globalization: The Coffee Connection:
Thousands of Miles from Boston's Breakfast Tables and Fast-Food Restaurants, at
the Other End of a Global Trade Network, Guatemala's Farmers are Barely Scraping
By, THE BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, July 29, 2001, at Al, available at
http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/coffee/news200l/bostonglobe072901.html.
2. David Gonzalez, A Coffee Crisis' Devastating Domino Effect in Nicaragua,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 2001, at A3, available at http://www.globalexchange.org/ econ-
omy/coffee/news2001nyt082901.html.
3. Niko Price, Weak from Hunger, Nicaraguan Peasants Flee the Fields; Coffee
Glut, Feudal Traditions Combine to Starve Communities, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 28, 2001, at D1, available at http://www.globalexchange.
org/economy/coffee/news200l/ap082801.html.
4. Gonzalez, supra note 2.
5. Price, supra note 3.
6. Robert Collier, Fair Trade Offers Better Deal to Farmers: Network Ensures
Cooperative Farmers Get Paid Higher Price, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 20,
2001, at A21, available at http:/www.globalexchange.orgeconomy/ cof-
fee/sfchron05200la.html.
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fee, although the farmers and their families do not starve, they
still remain at poverty level.7
A big dip in the market price of coffee has caused the utter
desolation of farmers living in developing countries.8 The price
for coffee has dropped so low that the cost of producing coffee is
greater than the sum farmers receive for their yield. 9 The re-
cent low price was the culmination of a steep fall in prices since
the price of coffee beans peaked in 1995.10
While growers in developing countries are being paid less
for their coffee beans, consumers in developed countries have
been paying increasing prices for a cup of coffee.11 Demand for
coffee in developed countries is also on the rise.12 Unfortu-
nately, this increase in demand and profits is seen only by the
coffee companies, with little or no increase in profit trickling
down to the coffee grower.13 The result is an increasing gap be-
7. Neuffer, supra note 1.
8. Gonzalez, supra note 2. Prices went from $3 per pound in 1996 to $0.51 per
pound in August of this year. Price, supra note 3.
9. See Neuffer, supra note 1. "It currently costs most Guatemalan coffee farm-
ers about $90 to produce a hundred pounds of coffee. One hundred pounds of coffee
will sell for about $45." Id.
10. Nick Mathiason & Patrick Tooher, World Takes Caffeine Hit: Coffee Has
Fallen to Its Lowest Price in Decades, Plunging Growers into Poverty-Yet Demand
in the West Is at Record Levels, THE OBSERVER, Aug. 12, 2001, at 3, available at
http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/coffee/news200l/observerO8l2Ol.html.
11. Id. "Americans will pay $2 or more for a premium cup of coffee" sold over
the counter, but small farmers see very little of that money. Neuffer, supra note 1.
Statistics show that the price for coffee in the United States "var[ies] from $2.69 for
a 13-ounce can of Folgers to $8.49 for a one-pound bag of Starbucks beans [but]
farmers get less than 35 cents and coffee pickers less than 14 cents." Id. See also
Chris Tomlinson, Kenyan Coffee Growers Wonder Where All the Money is Going, CHI.
TRIB., July 29, 2001, at (Business) 7 available at http://www.globalexchange.org/
economy/coffee/new2001]apO72901.html ("Roasters pay $1.65 a pound, which in-
cludes agent fees and transportation and warehouse costs. Though his clients in-
clude Starbucks and Nestle, [the exporter's] agent said he made only 2 to 3 cents a
pound.").
12. Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10. "In Britain alone, the UK coffee shop
market grew by 55 percent between 1997 and 2000 and is not expected to reach
saturation until 2003." Id. According to statistics produced by the International
Coffee Organization, the "value of the coffee trade has increased by two-thirds" in
the last ten years. Id.
13. Stephen Franklin, 'Fair Trade' Coffee Perking Up Life: Higher Prices Bring
Benefits to Poor Growers, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 17, 2001, http://www.globalexchange.org
/economy/coffee/chicagotrib04l7Ol.html ("[tihe falling price of coffee has meant big-
ger profit margins for wholesalers and retail coffee chains, even as it inflicts hard-
ship on most coffee farmers"). See also Liz Stuart, Change the World with Your
Shopping Trolley; You Buy Organic Vegetables and You've Got the Environmentally
Friendly Tee Shirt. So What Else Can You Do? The Answer, if You Want to Help
Some of the World's Poorest Workers, Is Look for Products With the Fairtrade Mark.,
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tween the wealth of developed and developing countries. 14
This Note seeks to evaluate possible solutions for the pre-
sent crisis in the coffee market and argue that a global Fair
Trade solution is a viable solution to the present problems in the
coffee market. Part I describes the structure of the coffee mar-
ket and Part II explains the reasons for the presently low prices
paid to coffee farmers. Part III discusses historical solutions to
volatility in agricultural markets and more specifically in the
coffee market. Part IV evaluates possible solutions to the cur-
rent devastation caused by the low price of coffee. This Note
concludes that Fair Trade is a viable short term solution to the
coffee market crisis.
I. THE COFFEE MARKET
Coffee is the second largest world commodity following oil,
with $55 billion annually in sales. 15 Developing countries ac-
count for a large percentage of the world's coffee exports. 16 A
majority of these developing countries are highly dependent on
coffee for export and foreign exchange earnings. 7 Therefore,
when coffee prices plummet, the entire economy of coffee reliant
countries plummets as well.' 8 To make matters worse for devel-
THE GUARDIAN (London), June 23, 2001 (Job and Money Pages) at 2, available at
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. The author stated that Nestle's thirty-three per-
cent profit on every pound of the 720,000 tons of coffee the company buys is under-
standable, after she observed that farmers receive only seven percent of the price of
a jar of instant coffee, down from fourteen percent three years ago. Id.
14. JOHN CAVANAUGH, FAIR TRADE FEDERATION, Why Fair Trade? A Brief
Look at Free Trade in the Global Economy, at http://www.fairtradefederation.
comlab whyft.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2001). "Today, the richest 20% of the world's
population has 60 times the income of the poorest 20%." Id.
15. Neuffer, supra note 1.
16. Ad Koekkoek, Tropical Products, Developing Countries and the Uruguay
Round, 23:6 J. WORLD TRADE 127, 129 (1989). Developing countries account for
ninety percent to 100 percent of the world's exports in coffee. Id.
17. See J. DE GRAAFF, THE ECONOMICS OF COFFEE: ECONOMICS OF CROPS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES No. 1, 91 (1986). "In coffee economies such as those of El
Salvador and Guatemala in 1971-1975, coffee contributed 80% of total export tax
revenues and 10-15% of government revenues." Id. at 56.
18. See Jonathan Carlson, Symposium: International Law and World Hunger:
Hunger, Agricultural Trade Liberalization, and Soft International Law: Addressing
the Legal Dimensions of a Political Problem, 70 IOwA L. REV. 1187, 1220 (1985)
(stating "there has been significant detrimental reliance on export agriculture").
The decrease in coffee prices has had far-reaching effects on the region. For exam-
ple, towns have become poorer due to a decrease in tax receipts, causing these towns
to decrease services to their citizens. Farms have scaled back or closed, leaving nu-
merous people without means to support themselves. Also, small growers face the
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oping countries, the unregulated coffee market is extremely
volatile. 19 Out of all agricultural products, the instability of the
coffee market is ranked highest, tying with the market for co-
coa.20 This price instability is due to inelasticity of supply and
inelasticity of demand in the short run.21
Price inelasticity of supply in the short run occurs for a va-
riety of reasons. With a decline in price, growers are unlikely to
reduce their supply because the growers, as well as their coun-
tries, depend heavily on coffee production. 22 Countries have ex-
plored various alternative crops with limited success, thereby
leaving farmers with no alternative but to produce coffee. 23 An-
other reason why a decrease in price does not cause a decrease
in supply is the relationship between fixed and variable costs in
the industry.24 Fixed costs account for a large portion of overall
production costs, while variable costs of harvesting are only a
very small portion of overall costs. 25 If growers can cover their
variable costs, there is no incentive for them to discontinue or
reduce production regardless of how low the market price for
coffee falls. 26 On the other hand, when prices increase, growers
cannot increase their supply because new coffee plants require
three to five years before beans can be harvested. 27 The supply
of coffee is also affected by the fact that consuming nations have
considerable coffee stocks. 28
loss of their land due to their debts to banks and coffee processors. See Gonzalez,
supra note 2.
19. See Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10
20. DE GRAAFF, supra note 17, at 92.
21. Matthew J. Foli, International Coffee Agreements and the Elusive Goal of
Price Stability, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 79, 81 (1995). This means that price
changes do not readily coincide with changes in supply and demand. Id.
22. M. TH. A. PIERTERSE & H.J. SILVIS, THE WORLD COFFEE MARKET AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT, 21 (1988).
23. DE GRAAFF, supra note 17, at 81. See also PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra
note 22, at 23. Estate holders can engage in at least some alternative activities but
a smallholder has few other alternatives and will pick at least a portion of his crop.
Id. The problem is that smallholders produce the majority of coffee in eighty per-
cent of countries. See DE GRAAFF, supra note 17, at 34.
24. Foli, supra note 21, at 81-82.
25. Id. at 82.
26. Id.
27. Id. The first harvest occurs between three and four years, but a coffee tree
does not reach its maximum yield for another two to three years beyond the first
harvest. Coffee trees can have an economic life of up to fifty years, but after fifteen
years the trees start to show a decline in yield. PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note 22, at
6.
28. Edward Quill, The Failure of International Commodity Agreements: Forms,
Functions, and Implications, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 503, 521 (1994).
[Vol. 11:337
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Demand for coffee is also relatively inelastic in both the
short term and long term.29 Economists believe the inelasticity
of demand is caused by consumer taste preferences. 30 A drop in
demand for coffee only occurs at extremely high prices.31 The
problem is that high coffee prices often lead to a drop in demand
for extended periods of time.32 At this price level, consumers are
willing to substitute for other less costly beverages, such as soft
drinks, juices, and tea.33
II. REASONS FOR THE LOW PRICE OF COFFEE PAID TO
GROWERS
Many reasons exist for the present markedly low price of
coffee paid to growers. The primary rationale cited for the de-
crease in price is oversupply.34 Oversupply is mainly a result of
the World Bank 35 and the French Government's investment in
Vietnam's coffee industry to help the country develop a new
cash crop. 36 The heavy investment caused Vietnam to go from
being a peripheral player in the coffee industry to the world's
second largest producer. 37 In the past five years, Vietnam has
doubled its production of low quality robusta beans,38 flooding
the world's coffee market.39 The decrease in the price of robusta
29. Foli, supra note 21, at 83.
30. Id.
31. PIETERSE & SILvIs, supra note 22, at 33.
32. DE GRAAFF, supra note 17, at 58.
33. Id. at 88.
34. Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10.
35. The World Bank has issued a statement that they have not encouraged cof-
fee production in Vietnam. Notwithstanding their official statement, the World
Bank has a list of programs that they say could have financed an increase in Viet-
nam's coffee industry. They claim all decisions regarding the dispersal of money in
these programs were in the hands of Vietnamese officials. Worldbank and Coffee in
Vietnam, The World Bank, at http://www.worldbank.org.vn/coffee.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2002).
36. Price, supra note 3.
37. Tomlinson, supra note 11.
38. Robusta beans are used in inexpensive blends and instant coffee, while, in
contrast, arabica beans are used in better coffee blends. Robert Collier, Mourning
Coffee: World's Leading Java Companies Are Raking in High Profits, but Growers
Worldwide Face Ruin as Prices Sink to Historic Low, THE SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, May 20, 2001, at Al, available at httpJ/www.transfairusa.org
/update/2001]chron20 .html. Robusta beans are heartier than arabica beans, see
PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note 22, at 7; have a greater yield, DE GRAAFF supra note
17, at 49; and the two beans are grown in different areas of the world. Id. at 73.
39. Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10.
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beans subsequently brought down the price of arabica beans.40
Coffee companies wanted the cheapest coffee the market had to
offer, and pursued low quality coffee that otherwise would have
been dumped and not sold in the market.41
Oversupply in the industry has also been attributed to ad-
vancements in technology, 42 including new strains of coffee
plants and new intensive farming methods. 43  In particular,
Brazil has created mechanized robusta farms, which farmers
have located in areas not prone to frosts, to prevent crop de-
struction similar to the destruction caused by previous frosts.44
Because of these technological advances, Brazil, like Vietnam,
has also been able to flood the market with low quality robusta
beans, thereby contributing to falling coffee prices.45
A third reason for the drop in prices paid to farmers is the
structure of the market itself.46 The coffee industry is an oli-
gopsony,47 wherein a few global corporations acquire beans from
a number of small producers.48 Many coffee corporations in de-
veloped countries rely solely on a limited group of elite exporters
from which the corporations get their beans. 49 Most of these cof-
fee corporations are unaware of the plight of farmers in develop-
ing countries because they have no direct contact with these
farmers.50
40. Collier, supra note 38.
41. Price, supra note 3.
42. See Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10.
43. Id. In Colombia, farmers are decreasing coffee areas, but they increase
yields by self-shading and applying greater amounts of fertilizer. DE GRAAFF,
supra note 17, at 42, 165.
44. DEGRAFF, supra note 17, at 124. Farms that are mechanized have a ma-
chine that shakes the tree and a device to collect the beans. Id. at 40. Mechaniza-
tion is not available in countries that have a sloping terrain. Id. at 165.
45. Tomlinson, supra note 11.
46. See Neuffer, supra note 1.
47. An oligopsony exists where a few large firms purchase the existing supply
in a particular product market. DAVID N. HYMAN, MODERN MICROECONOMICS G.7
(1986).
48. Id. In North America and Western Europe, fifty percent of the coffee trade
is handled by four corporations. Two corporations account for seventy-five percent of
all world sales of soluble coffee. DE GRAAFF, supra note 17, at 63. More recent sta-
tistics show that four companies account for sixty percent of coffee sales in the
United States and forty percent of coffee sales worldwide. Neuffer, supra note 1.
49. Neuffer, supra note 1. "[It is estimated that 50% of all trade is handled by
predominantly large international trading houses." PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note
22, at 39.
50. Fair Trade Coffee, Peace Coffee, at http://www.peacecoffee.com/
fairtrade.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Fair Trade]. When the ex-
ecutive at Nestle was asked what the difference between sun versus shade-grown
PERKING UP THE COFFEE INDUSTRY
What these large corporations are ignoring is a system
where coffee beans pass through as many as fifteen different
entities before the beans finally reach the consumer.51 Each
entity that handles the coffee between the farmer and the
exporter works to increase its profit, at times padding the
price.52 The group that does the most damage to the local coffee
growers is the local speculators or "coyotes."53
Small farmers are individually unable to market and dis-
tribute their crops for themselves, 4 and thus find themselves in
a weak negotiating position.5 5 These farmers produce too small
a volume to be able to sell directly to exporters, who buy in bulk
lots.56 Thus, the farmers have no choice but to sell their coffee
to a "coyote," who retains most of the profit from the sale of the
farmer's coffee.57 "Coyotes" are able to pay coffee farmers an un-
fair price for coffee because the farmers lack knowledge of the
commodity market price.58 Coffee growers agree to sell to "coyo-
tes" at low prices because they harvest only once a year, and by
that time are desperate for money, which puts them at a distinct
disadvantage in bargaining.59 Moreover, coffee farmers are
forced to borrow money from "coyotes" in order to finance their
next crop because, unlike estate owners, many farmers are un-
able to obtain credit.60 The advances from "coyotes" ensure that
farmers will be paid an even lower price than the small sum
they would normally receive. 61
Coffee farmers have no recourse against the "coyotes" that
are price gouging them.62 If coffee farmers complain about the
price they are receiving for their coffee, "coyotes" will simply
coffee, a controversial issue in the coffee business, he was unable to respond. Id.
51. Neuffer, supra note 1. A coffee bean starts with the small farmer, and then
travels up the chain to the local speculator, the exporter, the importer/broker, the
roaster, the distributor, the retail outlet or cafe, who finally sells to the consumer.
Fair Trade, supra note 50. Another estimate says the coffee can change hands as
many as 150 times. Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10.
52. Neuffer, supra note 1.
53. See Fair Trade, supra note 50.
54. Andrew Bibby, Ethical Business: Where to Find Coffee That Doesn't Leave a
Nasty Taste, THE OBSERVER, Nov. 30, 1997, at 8 available at 1997 WL 13001588.
55. Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10.
56. Neuffer, supra note 1.
57. Bibby, supra note 54, at 8.
58. Stuart, supra note 13, at 2.
59. Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10.
60. Fair Trade, supra note 50.
61. Id.
62. See Neuffer, supra note 1.
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find another supplier.63 Governments have tolerated the exis-
tence of "coyotes" in the coffee market, despite industry efforts
to remove them.64
III. PREVIOUS SOLUTIONS
A. INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PRODUCERS
AND CONSUMERS
International Coffee Agreements were signed in 1962, 1968,
1976, and 1983 as an attempt to stabilize the market price of
coffee.65 These agreements were each enacted as a short term
means of fixing a crisis in the market, but each failed to achieve
the long term goal of stabilization.66 The International Coffee
Agreements were more successful in preventing prices from
dropping than preventing prices from rising.67 The principal
means employed by these agreements to stabilize prices was to
place restrictions on the amount of coffee being exported to par-
ticipating countries. 68
The United States originally rejected an International Cof-
fee Agreement because any such agreement would be a restric-
tion on free trade.69 The Kennedy administration later re-
thought the U.S. position because the administration was afraid
that an economic disruption from a coffee market drop would
lead Latin American countries to succumb to communism.70 The
main factor that paved the way for passage of the first Interna-
tional Coffee Agreement in Congress was the U.S. coffee indus-
try's support, which the coffee industry gave freely for fear that
the supply of coffee would be disrupted. 71
The final International Coffee Agreement of 1983 was
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Foli, supra note 21, at 84-94; see also Int'l Coffee Agreement 1962, opened
for signature Sept. 28, 1962, art. 2(2), 14 U.S.T. 1911, 1914, 469 U.N.T.S. 169, 174;
Int'l Coffee Agreement 1968, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 6333, 647
U.N.T.S. 3; Int'l Coffee Agreement 1976, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1976, 28
U.S.T. 6401, 1024 U.N.T.S. 3; Int'l Coffee Agreement 1983, opened for signature Jan
1, 1983, 1333 U.N.T.S. 119.
66. Foli, supra note 21, at 85.
67. DE GRAAFF, supra note 17, at 95.
68. Foli, supra note 21, at 84-85.
69. Id. at 85.
70. Id. at 85-86.
71. Id.
344 [Vo1.11:337
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abandoned in 1989, due to rigidity of supply in the quota system
and enforcement problems.72 The International Coffee Organi-
zation was unable to prevent producing countries from selling
coffee to countries not bound by the agreement, who in turn sold
the coffee to countries that were bound. 73 In this way, producing
countries were able to circumvent their quota restrictions. 74 The
United States issued a more formal statement declaring that
withdrawal was appropriate because the agreement circum-
vented free trade.75
When the agreement expired in 1989, Brazil, Colombia, and
Mexico flooded the coffee market.76 The countries released large
quantities of coffee that they had warehoused because of the ex-
port quotas. 77 Flooding the market led to a drop in price, which
continued to remain at low levels from 1989 through 1993.78
The agreement had controlled more than ninety percent of the
world's coffee production.79
B. COFFEE AGREEMENTS AMONG PRODUCERS
Brazil made the first unilateral move to control the coffee
market in the 1900's.80 The Brazilian government decided that
the best way to control the market was to restrict output, a
model the International Coffee Agreements later followed.81
Brazil, therefore, started to burn coffee from the bumper crops
the country was producing in the 1920s.82 The artificially high
price level that was created led farmers to increase the amount
of coffee trees and production.s3 This increased planting of cof-
fee led to an over production in the coffee market that lasted un-
til World War II.84 The most detrimental effect of Brazil's ex-
72. Id. at 92.
73. Id. See also PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note 22, at 80.
74. See Foli, supra note 21, at 92.
75. Id. at 94.
76. Id. at 93.
77. Id. at 88.
78. Id. at 93-94.
79. Quill, supra note 28, at 523.
80. Id. at 519. At that time, Brazil controlled sixty percent of the coffee mar-
ket. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See Quill, supra note 28, at 519. The overproduction and price decrease
lasted for such an extended period due to the amount of time it takes for a coffee
plant to produce beans and reach its full productive capacity. See id.
20021
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periment was its resulting loss of market share.85 Brazil then
realized the need for a concerted industry effort, but other pro-
ducing countries were unwilling to enter into an output agree-
ment at that time.86
In 1945, Central American and the Caribbean countries,
along with Mexico formed FEDECAME.8 7 The organization was
comprised of fourteen nations but was a rather weak entity.88
Countries continuously bypassed its channels of international
negotiation and negotiated individually with other countries.8 9
In 1954, talks were initiated regarding the first interna-
tional coffee agreement.90 The United States pulled out of the
agreement at the last minute, claiming the agreement inhibited
free trade.91 In 1957, due to a rapid decrease in price, seven
Latin American countries signed an agreement to limit exports
via quotas, which eventually came to be known as the Latin
American Coffee Agreement. 92 Eight more South American
countries later signed the agreement, and France and Portugal
pledged the support of their African colonies.93 Despite the de-
gree of support, this agreement was not successful in preventing
a further decrease in coffee prices.94 There was no enforcement
provision in the agreement, which allowed a number of coun-
tries to cheat, and made the agreement somewhat ineffectual. 95
Some conclusions may be drawn from the history of agree-
ments between coffee-producing countries. First, quotas insti-
tuted by a single country are not adequate to stabilize the mar-
ket.96 Second, the large number of coffee producing countries
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note 22, at 62.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 60. Even though prices were still high, officials in coffee produc-
ing countries knew that a market drop was soon to follow. Id.
91. Id.
92. PIETERSE & SILvIs, supra note 22, at 60.
93. See id. Brazil later convinced other African countries to participate in the
agreement by threatening to unload its surplus of stored coffee into the market. Al-
though Brazil was not going to make good on this threat because doing so would de-
crease their profits, African countries believed the credibility of the threat and
signed the agreement. See id. at 61.
94. Id. at 60.
95. See id. at 61.
96. See Quill, supra note 28, at 519. Also, unity in coffee exporting countries is
beneficial because it is necessary to elicit change in the policy of industrialized na-
tions. Kel6 Onyejekwe, Gatt, Agriculture, and Developing Countries, 17 HAMLINE L.
REV. 77, 94 (1993).
[Vo1.11:337
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and their varied interests make the enforcement of agreements
between them extremely difficult.97 Finally, producing countries
needed the assistance of consuming countries to be able to ade-
quately enforce any agreement and the necessary quotas con-
tained therein.98
C. THE U.S. APPROACH TO FALLING AGRICULTURAL PRICES
Critics have accused the United States of being hypocritical
in its endorsement of free trade, while at the same time protect-
ing it own agricultural industry.99 In the U.S. farm industry,
the United States has used nonrecourse loans, 100 deficiency
payments, 1 1 and acreage reduction programs. 0 2  The United
States also implemented the Export Credit Guarantee Program,
where the government guarantees payment to exporters if a for-
eign buyer defaults, thus allowing domestic producers to sell at
a lower price because the producers face less risk.103 Another
program the government has implemented to help U.S. farmers
is the Export Enhancement Program. Through this program,
the government provides relief to U.S. exporters that have been
harmed by unfair trade practices. 10 4 Relief is paid either in cash
or an equivalent amount of the commodity that was treated un-
fairly in the market, which the government collects from its
nonrecourse loans. 0 5
The U.S. farm policy has the most beneficial effects on do-
97. See Quill, supra note 28, at 521. See also Onyejekwe, supra note 96, at 93
(Developing countries "differ in size, levels of development, composition of trade, and
indebtedness; in short, the countries have few things in common"). See also Ricardo
Cevallos, The Central American Bank for Economic Integration, 4 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 245, 267 (1996) ("[Slome countries are more industrialized than others,
some are densely populated, and some are still reconstructing their infrastructure.").
98. See PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note 22, at 62.
99. See Raj Bhala, Marxist Origins of the "Anti-Third World" Claim, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 132, 150-51 (2000) ("[C]apitalists advocate free trade policies
vis-A-vis developing countries... simultaneously, they lobby their governments for
protection from foreign imports, so as to avoid exacerbating competitive pressures in
domestic markets.").
100. Id. Nonrecourse loans allow farmers to use their crops as collateral. Id.
101. See Liane L. Heggy, Free Trade Meets United States Farm Policy: Life After
the Uruguay Round, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1367, 1372 (1994). Deficiency pay-
ments are where the government sets a target market price and if the actual market
price falls below this level, the difference is paid to the farmer. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 1374.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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mestic producers and foreign importers. 0 6 Through United
States programs, U.S. farmers can receive greater income from
their crops, while at the same time foreign importers pay lower
prices. 107 The problem with the farm policy is that the U.S. gov-
ernment picks up the tab, totaling about $20 billion per year,
not including the cost to American consumers, 108 a feat which
developing countries are unable to replicate. 109 Moreover, while
demand has not increased and the amount of exports from the
United States has not changed, farm productivity has continued
to rise, creating a largely inefficient market.110
A number of reasons have been offered for the subsidization
of U.S. farms, some of which will be addressed here. The main
reason for subsidization was the concern that the United States
would become dependent on other nations for food, and thereby
be at the mercy of those countries' political whims."' The gov-
ernment's goal is to have farmers increase the agricultural base
and produce surpluses to ensure the country's food security and
independence. 1 2 Also, because it is a leading exporter in world
agricultural markets, the United States can influence a large
share of the world's food supply and thus has considerable eco-
nomic and political power. 113 A second reason for subsidization
is the political support gained from romantic notions of farmers
as self-determinative people working on their "golden fields of
grain.""4 Subsidization secures the jobs of many of these inde-
pendent farmers. 115 Finally, agriculture is unlike any other in-
106. See id. at 1374-75.
107. Id.
108. Jeffrey J. Steinle, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform School for
Agriculture, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333, 340 (1995). In 1989, it was estimated
that Americans paid $67 billion through taxes and the increased cost of goods from
the U.S. farm policy. Id. A study has also estimated that the United States loses
$80,000 for every farm job gained. Id. at 340-341. Worldwide the cost of protection-
ism for farmers is estimated at $150 billion per year. Id. at 340. See Collier, supra
note 38, at 3 ("As a result, nations that cannot subsidize their farm sectors are fal-
ling deeper into debt while their people get poorer.").
109. Heggy, supra note 101, at 1374.
110. Steinle, supra note 108, at 339-40.
111. Id. at 335. Food embargos have been used in times of war, to stop human
rights violations, and to dissuade countries from using military force. Steinle, supra
note 108, at 335-336. See also, Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of Compara-
tive Advantage: The Prospects for Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round
of GATT Negotiations, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 123, 128-129 (1989).
112. Steinle, supra note 108, at 336.
113. See id. at 335. See also Heggy, supra note 101, at 1370-71.
114. Steinle, supra note 108, at 337.
115. Filipek, supra note 111, at 129.
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dustry in the economy in that farm prices are unstable and
farmers suffer declining incomes in the long run.116
D. THE FAIR TRADE SOLUTION ON A SMALL SCALE
Fair Trade is another program developed by independent
organizations to improve the market for coffee." 7 The overall
objective of the Fair Trade movement is to establish a more eq-
uitable relationship between consumers in developed countries
and producers in developing countries."" Fair Trade organiza-
tions try to encourage producer self-sufficiency through fair
wages and educational programs, while also being culturally
and environmentally conscious. 119 The program does not pro-
vide aid or charity, but instead promotes fairness for farmers in
the global trading scheme. 120 In the coffee industry, the primary
goal of Fair Trade organizations is to ensure that coffee farmers
receive a fair price for their coffee, providing farmers with a de-
cent living wage. 121
Fair Trade is a grass roots movement that began in
Europe. 122 In 2000, four million pounds of Fair Trade coffee
were sold in the United States alone, double the amount sold
the previous year. 123 Currently, there are ninety-seven coffee
116. Id.
117. See Fair Trade, supra note 50.
118. What is Fair Trade Certified Coffee All About?, Global Exchange, at
http://www.globalexchange.orgeconomy/coffee/background.html (last visited Sept.
10, 2001). See also Alicia Morris Groos, International Trade and Development: Ex-
ploring the Impact of Fair Trade Organizations in the Global Economy and the Law,
34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 379, 380 (1999) ("The fair trade movement's goal is to change the
way in which international trade is conducted between developed world consumers
and developing world producers by making the welfare of the producer of primary
importance.").
119. See FTF Principles and Practices, Fair Trade Federation at
httpJ/fairtradefederation.com/abprinc.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
120. Fair Trade, supra note 50.
121. Id.
122. Eve Mitchell, Better or Bitter?, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, May 21, 2000, available
at http'/fwww. transfairusa.org/update/2000/oaktrib.5.21.00.html. Last year in the
United States, Transfair waged a campaign to convince Starbucks to sell Fair Trade
coffee. Collier, supra note 6. Activists demonstrated outside stores, disrupted meet-
ings of top officials, and threatened a boycott. Id. Starbucks finally relented and
now sells a minimal amount of Fair Trade coffee. Id.
123. Franklin, supra note 13. Fair Trade coffee is expected to sell twenty five
million pounds by the year 2004, which would make up one percent of all coffee sales
in the U.S. coffee market. Id. This year, sales have already exceeded eight million
pounds of coffee. Surviving Globalization: "Fair Trade: The Human Buzz," Lively-
hood, PBS at http://www.pbs.org/livelyhood/planetwork/survivingtfair.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 25, 2002). In Europe, where Fair Trade coffee has existed for around
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roasters and importers in the United States that sell Fair Trade
coffee, 124 and 550,000 farmers in twenty-one countries producing
that coffee.125 The current minimum price paid to growers for
Fair Trade coffee is $1.26 per pound for arabica and $1.06 per
pound for robusta.26 Of that price, a portion goes to the coop-
erative, while the farmers only receive between $1.00 and $1.10
per pound. 2 7 By contrast, growers that are not associated with
a Fair Trade cooperative receive between thirty cents and fifty
cents per pound from "coyotes." 28
Fair Trade organizations have established a system where
small coffee growers can bypass the "coyotes" who price gouge
them. 29 Coffee is purchased directly from the grower, eliminat-
ing the "coyote" entirely 30 In pooling their resources, coopera-
tives are increasing their power in and access to the market,
thus eliminating the function of a "coyote."' 3' Fair Trade or-
ganizations also help coffee growers acquire the resources and
skills to process coffee to the point of export, increasing the cof-
fee's value and eliminating the middlemen involved in process-
ing. 32
twelve years, last year's sales exceeded $300 million. See Fair Trade, supra note 50.
124. See Collier, supra note 6. Fair Trade coffee can be found at Starbucks and
Borders Books, for example. Id. Fair Trade coffee is expected to be introduced by
Safeway supermarkets and Denny's restaurants in the near future. Id. Fair Trade
coffee is also served in English Parliament, several national legislatures, and the
headquarters of companies such as Toyota and Warner Bros., Europe. Fact Sheet,
TransFair USA at http://www.transfairusa.org/update/facts.html (last visited Feb.
25, 2002). Concord Democrat George Miller has started a petition to convince Con-
gress to require Starbucks to sell only Fair Trade coffee in Congress, the Supreme
Court, and other public buildings. Patt Morrison, Legislators Back on the Job After
Letting Hair Down: Saying No to an Unfair Cuppa Joe, L.A. TIMES, August 27, 2001,
at Part 2, Page 2, Metro Desk, available at http://www.transfairusa.
org/update/2001/latimes_8_27.htm.
125. Franklin, supra note 13.
126. Stuart, supra note 13. Growers receive an extra fifteen cents a pound if the
coffee is certified organic. Fact Sheet, TransFair USA at httpJ/www.transfairusa.
org/update/facts.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
127. Franklin, supra note 13.
128. Franklin, supra note 13 (thirty cents). Fact Sheet, TransFair USA at
http://www.transfairusa.org/update/facts.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002) (thirty-
eight cents). Collier, supra note 6 (fifty cents).
129. Fair Trade, supra note 50.
130. Id.
131. See Groos, supra note 118, at 391. See supra note 54 and accompanying
text (discussing the problem that growers receive low prices because exporters only
buy in bulk and small farmers do not produce enough to meet these demands).
132. Fair Trade, supra note 50. Farmers are still unable to eliminate roasters in
the equation because green coffee is easier to store, easier to transport, and import-
ers prefer to mix their own coffee blends. DE GRAAFF, supra note 17, at 86.
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Under the Fair Trade program, farmers no longer need the
"coyote" to function as a creditor. 133 Previously, growers were
forced to accept a lower advance price from "coyotes" for fear
their next harvest would not be profitable.134 Farmers are now
able to receive advance credit on coffee purchases and establish
long term relationships with buyers.' 35 Fair Trade organiza-
tions also teach farmers much needed financial management
skills.1 36
Fair Trade programs are also beneficial because they em-
phasize community, education, environment, and culture.
37
Farmers are required to reinvest a portion of their earnings into
both the community and the infrastructure through their de-
mocratically run cooperatives 38 to provide for such things as
healthcare and education. 13 9 Families and communities are
strengthened by the community-oriented aspects of the coopera-
tives in the production of coffee. 40 Moreover, cooperatives also
emphasize education of the farmers by teaching them to become
more productive' 4 ' and giving them the means to purchase new
technology. 42
Even though farmers are increasing their productivity, they
are still required to respect the environment. 43 Through Fair
Trade, coffee growers have enough capital to engage in tradi-
133. Fair Trade, supra note 50.
134. Id.
135. Id. Fair Trade organizations provide farmers with financial assistance in
the form of direct loans, prepayment, or by connecting farmers to creditors. FTF
Principles and Practices, Fair Trade Federation at http://www.fairtradefederation.
comlab.princ.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002). Also, Fair Trade organizations offer
immediate financing to coffee growers in time for production rather than waiting
sixty to ninety days like many commercial importers. Id.
136. See Fair Trade, supra note 50.
137. FTF Principles and Practices, Fair Trade Federation at
http://www.fairtradefederation.com/ab-princ.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
138. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. One cooperative in Loma Linda
used the extra money they received from fairly traded coffee to bring electricity into
their village, pave a road so trucks could pick up coffee beans, and send their chil-
dren to school which they otherwise could not afford. Franklin, supra note 13.
139. Fair Trade, supra note 50.
140. Groos, supra note 118, at 391 ("supplemental income from these activities
keeps family members at home who would otherwise have to travel great distances
to find work, thus preserving the family unit").
141. See FTF Principles and Practices, Fair Trade Federation at
http://www.fairtradefederation.com/ab-princ.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
142. TransFair USA at http://www.transfairusa.org/update/facts.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 25, 2002).
143. Membership Criteria, Fair Trade Federation at http'//www. fairtradefedera-
tion.com/memcrit.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
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tional, low-impact farming.144 Fair Trade farmers use the
shade-grown coffee technique, 145 where coffee trees are planted
under taller rainforest trees.146 This technique allows less land
to be cleared to produce coffee, thus preserving wildlife. 47
Moreover, these coffee farmers are more likely to produce or-
ganic beans and therefore, less likely to use pesticides. 48 Coop-
eratives that are not already producing organic coffee use their
joint profits to provide education to farmers about organic farm-
ing.149
In order to determine which coffee has been fairly traded,
Fair Trade organizations have established a certification sys-
tem. 50  Coffee that meets these Fair Trade standards is
stamped with a Fair Trade label.' 5' Fair Trade organizations,
through a network, independently monitor compliance with fair
trade certification standards. 152 This network employs more
than fifty inspectors who ensure that coffee is being fairly
traded and cooperatives are investing money in the community
and infrastructure. 153
Critics have noted some problems with the Fair Trade sys-
tem that is presently in place. The main concern is that not
enough high quality coffee exists to meet the needs of coffee cor-
porations, 54 especially in the specialty coffee sector.155 Coopera-
144. See Fair Trade, supra note 50.
145. The two growing techniques of coffee are shade-grown and full-sun or tech-
nified. Shade-grown is the traditional method where coffee plants are grown under
the canopy of trees. Through this method, less chemicals are needed for pesticides
and fertilizer. Full-sun coffee, as its name suggests, is grown without shade trees,
thus requiring farmers to clear the land for coffee farms and use more chemical fer-
tilizers to compensate for the loss of nutrients previously supplied by the canopy
trees. The benefit of full-sun coffee is that yields and profits are increased, in part
because farmers can plant more trees closer together. Organic/Shade Grown, Peace
Coffee at http'//www.peacecoffee.com/ organic/htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2002).
146. See TransFair USA, supra note 142.
147. Morrison, supra note 124.
148. TransFair USA, supra note 142.
149. Id.
150. See Fair Trade, supra note 50. Standards require that 100 percent of the
coffee be from a fair trade cooperative. Mitchell, supra note 122.
151. See Fair Trade, supra note 50. Coffee must be purchased through the net-
work of fair trade organizations before the coffee is stamped with a black-and-white
Fair Trade label. Collier, supra note 6.
152. What is Fair Trade Certified Coffee All About?, Global Exchange at
http://www.globalexchange.org/economy/coffeelbackground.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2002).
153. Collier, supra note 6.
154. Franklin, supra note 13.
155. Mitchell, supra note 122. This is due in part to the fact that Fair Trade
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tives pool the coffee that is produced, regardless of whether that
coffee is gourmet coffee or a cheaper version, which results in
the gourmet sector's disinterest in Fair Trade coffee. 156 Other
critics claim that Fair Trade organizations can do nothing for
gourmet coffee growers, because gourmet growers' specialty cof-
fee does not allow them to join a cooperative.157 On the demand
side, Fair Trade coffee will cost consumers an additional twenty-
five to fifty cents per pound. 158 This concern is offset, however,
by customer polls showing that seventy-five percent of people
would pay more for Fair Trade products.159
A number of critics believe that the better solution to the
problem is either to teach farmers to grow gourmet quality cof-
fee at increased profit, 160 or let market forces take over and let
less efficient producers remove themselves from the market. 161
Still others advocate another International Coffee Agreement. 162
IV. EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE
COFFEE MARKET CRISIS
A. WHY FREE MARKET FORCES ARE NOT THE SOLUTION
1. Free Market Forces Have Not Worked in the Past
The main reason cited for the decline in the market price of
coffee is that the supply of coffee is exceeding consumer demand
for coffee.163 According to economic models, under normal mar-
ket forces, this situation should result in a decrease in supply
originated in Europe and was targeted at commercial coffee, rather than specialty
coffee. Id. Moreover, specialty coffees are grown in specific regions, thereby exacer-
bating the problem. Id.
156. Id. This concern has been rejected by the certification manager at
TransFair USA and the manager of Uncommon Grounds, a wholesale roaster, who
said, "[tihe coffee that I've cupped has been top quality." Id.
157. Mitchell, supra note 122.
158. Sam MacDonald, Want Some Justice in Your Coffee? Using the Market to
Make Social Change, REASON MAGAZINE ONLINE, Aug. 24, 2001, available at
http://www.transfairusa.org/update/2001/reason.8_24.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2002).
159. Bibby, supra note 54.
160. Mitchell, supra note 122.
161. See Collier, supra note 38.
162. Id. See also Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10.
163. Foli, supra note 21, at 84.
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culminating in a state of market equilibrium.164 Unfortunately,
a stable equilibrium in the coffee market is next to impossible
due to inelasticity of supply and demand. 165 The coffee market
continuously vacillates between a state of undersupply and
oversupply, which inflicts a great deal of harm on the economies
of underdeveloped countries that produce the majority of the
world's coffee. 166
When a state of oversupply occurs, like at present, economic
theory suggests that more efficient firms will continue to pro-
duce a greater amount of the product while less efficient firms
will leave the market to engage in other activities. 67 Critics
have suggested that small coffee growers should switch produc-
tion to either gourmet coffee that fetches a higher market price
or to a different agricultural crop when the price of coffee
drops. 168 This assumes that the opportunity cost of producing
other agricultural products or gourmet coffee is lower than the
opportunity cost of producing their grade of coffee, or producing
nothing at all. 69 However, few viable alternative agricultural
crops actually exist for farmers who wish to discontinue produc-
tion of coffee.1 70 Also, the production of gourmet coffee requires
special resources and knowledge that the average farmer does
not possess. 17' Therefore, the opportunity cost to farmers of
producing an alternative agricultural product or of producing
gourmet coffee would be very high. Coffee farmers would need
additional education in order to switch production, which they
164. See JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE CHOICE 64-65 (7th ed. 1995).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 21-33.
166. See PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note 22, at 68. Undersupply has resulted
from events as diverse as frosts in Brazil, floods, and political unrest, all culminat-
ing in an increase in the price of coffee. Id.
167. Collier, supra note 38. The principal economist for the World Bank, Don
Mitchell, explained the idea that "losers [in the coffee market] must switch to farm-
ing other crops." Collier, supra note 38.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 158-159.
169. See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 164, at 32-33.
170. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Few agricultural alternatives
are available in areas where coffee is the main commodity, because alternatives do
not have the same "ecological requirements, agro-economic characteristics, and
world market of a similar magnitude." DE GRAAFF, supra note 17.
171. See Mitchell, supra note 122 (citing Gerry Baldwin, chairman of Peet's Cof-
fee & Tea, "In order to produce specialty coffee, you need altitude and experience in
growing the coffee and selling it and producing it as a high-valued product."). An-
other concern about gourmet coffee production is that the gourmet industry accounts
for only eight percent of the coffee industry, leaving very little room for an influx of a
large amount of farmers. See Price, supra note 3.
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are unable to afford in developing countries. 172
Economic theory assumes that, in the free market, other ra-
tional alternatives are available to a producer that is suffering
economic loss. 173 A complete lack of resources in developing
countries means that no such alternatives exist, aside from
camping on streets and in parks begging for food.174 In fact,
other layoffs are also occurring because of the collapse in the cof-
fee market.175 As industry spokespeople have suggested, the
free market has failed the coffee industry and particularly, has
failed these farmers. 76 Left to its own devices, the free market
has been unable to solve the humanitarian problems that result
from the instability of the world coffee market.
Moreover, economists note that price stability is one factor
that leads to efficiency in a market. 177 Price stability produces
predictability, increased certainty, and security in contractual
agreements. 178 When price uncertainty is present, investors are
less likely to invest in that unstable environment. 179 Not only
do coffee-producing countries face a loss of investors because of
the inherent price instability in the coffee market, they will con-
tinue to face a lack of investment, which has negative effects on
the countries' individual economies. 80 Coffee farmers continue
to be left with no other alternative than to produce coffee be-
cause no other industry will be inclined to invest in such an un-
stable environment.' 8 ' The humanitarian problems resulting
from the drop in coffee prices will continue unless there is inter-
vention in this fluctuating market.
172. See Mitchell, supra note 122.
173. See Collier, supra note 38.
174. In Nicaragua, the President offered to bus coffee farmers back to their
farms and offered them jobs building roads, but few jobs have actually been created.
Price, supra note 3. See also Gonzalez, supra note 2 (quoting a migrant farm
worker, "there is no work"). See also Collier, supra note 38 ("[Nlations that cannot
subsidize their farm sectors are falling deeper into debt while their people get
poorer."). See also Foli, supra note 21, at 99 ("From the perspective of coffee produc-
ing countries, coffee is often an important source of export revenues. A decrease in
coffee prices can have a devastating effect on these economies").
175. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. In Guatemala, the unemploy-
ment rate in rural areas is said to have reached forty percent. Moreover, there is no
one hiring in the area. Collier, supra note 38.
176. See Neuffer, supra note 1.
177. GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 164, at 927.
178. See id. at 928.
179. Id.
180. See id. See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
181. See supra text accompanying note 179.
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2. Doing Away With "Coyotes" and Oligopsony Power
Farmers receive low prices for their crops in part because of
the structure of the industry 8 2 Two factors are pertinent to a
free market analysis, the "coyotes" or middlemen and the coffee
market's structure as an oligopsony. Middlemen are in some
cases beneficial to the market because they can reduce transac-
tion costs. 183 For a fee or markup in price, middlemen provide
information and arrange trades that would be more costly to
producers if the producers engaged in these activities them-
selves.' 84 Middlemen have the potential to increase efficiencies
in the market, but the situation becomes problematic when cof-
fee farmers are forced to rely solely on "coyotes" or middlemen to
sell their coffee to exporters. 85 Exporters only purchase coffee
in bulk lots and small farmers produce too small a volume to in-
dividually negotiate with them. 8 6 According to economists, this
arrangement is an efficient market because middlemen provide
the service of selling to exporters and obtaining information that
growers are unable to do for themselves. 8 7 Such analysis ig-
nores the fact that growers in underdeveloped countries do not
have the resources to engage in these activities by themselves.
The farmer's choice to sell to a "coyote" is not the result of a
strategic business decision, but rather is the result of a lack of
education and a desperate need for basic necessities. 88
The middleman economic theory assumes that middlemen
free producers from activities with high transaction costs, allow-
ing producers to expend these resources on other beneficial ac-
tivities.18 9 In the present situation, farmers only increase their
profits and efficiency in the market by not dealing with the
"coyotes," which farmers are unable to do because of their lack
of resources.' 9° The free market system assumes that "coyotes"
are the most efficient means of selling coffee in the coffee mar-
ket, but there is the distinct possibility that if small farmers had
the education and resources to form themselves into coopera-
182. See supra text accompanying note 46.
183. See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 164, at 35. "The costs of the time,
effort, and other resources necessary to search out, negotiate, and conclude an ex-
change are called transaction costs." Id.
184. See id.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
186. See supra text accompanying note 56.
187. See id.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
189. See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 164, at 35.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
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tives, they would function more efficiently than the present sys-
tem involving "coyotes." Either way, cooperatives would in-
crease the price paid to farmers, possibly allowing farmers to ob-
tain a price that covers the cost of their expenses. 191
A second concern to economists should be the oligopolist
structure of the coffee market. 192 Two corporations account for
seventy-five percent of world sales in coffee. 193 Moreover, fifty
percent of all trade is handled by large international exporters,
which coffee corporations rely on almost exclusively for their
supply. 194 Oligopolists tend to recognize their interdependence
and act somewhat collusively, while still maintaining some
competition. 195 Oligopolistic prices tend to fall between levels of
monopolies and perfect competition. 196 Although economists
normally look at oligopolist pricing as that charged to end con-
sumers, the same theoretical model applies when oligopolists
are purchasing in an inelastic market where an adequate supply
exists. This phenomenon is called an oligopsony. 97 Oligopson-
ists in the coffee industry have no incentive to outbid one an-
other for available supplies and can set prices paid to producers
at their desired level. 98 Coffee growers are somewhat unable to
cease production of coffee due to a lack of alternatives, 99 so oli-
gopsonists can collude with each other and pay the lowest price
possible to maximize their profits. Oligoposonists are able to
take advantage of a market that has such an inelastic supply
because they are assured the supply of coffee will meet their
needs, especially in the short run.200
This scenario is likely happening today because as demand
increases and the price paid per cup of coffee increases, produc-
ers are being paid lower prices for their crops. 201 Oversupply
191. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
192. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
193. DE GRAAFF, supra note 17, at 63.
194. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
195. GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 164, at 606.
196. Id.
197. DAVID N. HYMAN, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 465 (1986).
198. See id. Competing firms are aware of their interdependence, and often
agree to restrain price competition. Id.
199. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
200. See Foli, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. See also Rob Crilly, News: Con-
sumer: Others, ABERDEEN PRESS AND JOURNAL, Oct. 20, 2000, at 17 (citing a com-
mercial manager for the Fairtrade Foundation, "Prices are often determined by go-
ing backwards. Retailers decide how much they want to sell products for, and then
how much they will pay producers." He went on to acknowledge that this is the rea-
son farmers in the developing world are paid a price that did not cover their costs of
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could be the sole reason for the declining prices paid to growers,
but if supply has been somewhat stagnant in part because of the
low price of coffee, 202 an increase in demand should increase the
price. 203 This indicates that other forces are at work aside from
normal supply and demand.
In the present free market system in the coffee market, it is
unclear whether the increased price paid by consumers is going
to "coyotes," to the oligopsonist coffee companies, or some com-
bination thereof.204 What is known is that producers are seeing
little or none of the extra money paid by consumers, and are still
unable to cover the costs of producing their coffee.205 Without
government intervention, the free market system has led to
gross inefficiencies. 20 6 All consumer and producer surpluses are
going directly to the oligopsonists and the "coyotes."20 7 These
surpluses would be more beneficial if they were going to the
people who need them the most: the small farmers.
In conclusion, economic theory suggests that markets are
most efficient when there is full information and a competitive
market in equilibrium. 208 Both of these factors are lacking in
the coffee market. Growers do not have full information regard-
ing the market price of coffee, mainly because coffee prices are
based on the New York futures market.20 9 These farmers are
accepting whatever price they are offered by the "coyotes" for
their coffee because they are simply unaware of the price they
could be receiving if there was full information in the market.
210
Moreover, the presence of an oligopsonist structure also leads to
the question of whether a truly competitive market exists in the
coffee industry.21' Also, the coffee industry is so unstable that
production).
202. One can assume that some reduction in supply is occurring if farmers are
leaving coffee beans to rot on the trees and have left the farms to camp on roads and
in parks. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
203. See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 164, at 58.
204. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
205. See id.
206. See supra text and accompanying note 9.
207. See STEVEN C. HACKETT, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES:
THEORY, POLICY, AND THE SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY, 42, 402, 416 (2d ed. 2001) Con-
sumer surplus is the difference between the maximum price a consumer is willing to
pay and the price that is actually charged to the consumer. Producer surplus is the
difference between the minimum price a seller is willing to accept and the price ac-
tually paid to the seller. Id.
208. See id. at 39, 47.
209. Fair Trade, supra note 50.
210. See supra text and accompanying note 58.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 203-204.
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no equilibrium is possible under a free market system.212 There-
fore, the free market system in place in the coffee market causes
a large amount of inefficiency in that market.
3. Ethical Consumerism
Ethical consumerism uses free market techniques to en-
courage businesses to pay attention to social and ethical issues
in their global trading markets. 213 The idea behind ethical con-
sumerism is that consumers who value social justice will pay
more for products that incorporate these values in their produc-
tion and trade methods. 214 Under a free market theory, no pro-
tectionist measures should be used to protect underdeveloped
countries, but rather consumers can protect these countries by
purchasing products made in an ethical manner. 215 Unfortu-
nately, ethical consumerism cannot solve the imminent prob-
lems presently faced by the coffee industry.
In the coffee market, Fair Trade is the means for consumers
to exercise their ethical buying power.216 The success of the Fair
Trade initiative rests exclusively on the public's shoulders, who
must decide whether they are willing to pay an increased price
for coffee in order to help small farmers earn a living wage. 217
One of the best examples of how consumers have used their
power in the coffee market is when Starbucks adopted Fair
Trade coffee. Starbucks was pressured into adopting Fair Trade
coffee when civil rights groups picketed the corporation's
stores. 218 Activists are currently threatening to boycott Star-
212. See supra text accompanying notes 21-33.
213. See Roger Trapp, Finance: How Companies Can Give Themselves a Moral
Flavour, THE INDEP. (London), Nov. 12, 1997, at 10-11.
214. See Crilly, supra note 201. See also Natasha Walter, You Can Have Your
Cake and Eat It; 'As You Watch Programmes About Modern-Day Slave Labour, You
Don't Have to Weep Those Fat Tears Into Slave-Produced Cocoa', THE INDEP. (Lon-
don), June 11, 2001, at 5 (Critics call this idea "exploiting idealism for profit."). See
also GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 164, at 601 (stating that if consumers con-
tinue to purchase a product after an increase in price, the consumer must be gaining
something valuable for that increase in price).
215. See Bruce D. Fisher, The Ethical Consumer: A Rejecter of Positive Law Ar-
bitrage, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 230, 265 (1994).
216. See Jacqueline Donachy, Charity Shoppers Enjoy a Fair Trade; Helping Out
Good Causes While You Do Your Shopping Is Catching On, EVENING TIMES (Glas-
gow), Oct. 27, 2000, at 28. See also Fair Trade, supra note 50.
217. See Donachy, supra note 6.
218. Franklin, supra note 13. See also G. Pascal Zachary, Business Brief Star-
bucks Adopts Guidelines to Improve Conditions for Foreign Coffee Workers, WALL.
ST. J., Oct. 23, 1995, at B4. Unfortunately, less than one percent of the coffee that
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bucks again unless Starbucks agrees to sell brewed Fair Trade
coffee in addition to the beans.219
Fair Trade as a consumer effort is a good long term goal,
but unfortunately this solution will not solve the problems that
the coffee market currently faces, particularly the large unem-
ployment level of coffee farmers.220 At present, Fair Trade coffee
accounts for less than one percent of coffee sales in the world,221
but is continuing to grow.222 There is also evidence that con-
sumers are not as eager about ethical consumerism as they once
were.223 Some people claim that ethical consumerism is just a
passing trend that is already out of vogue with consumers.224
Others claim that ethical consumerism does not help the social
problems of the world because eventually consumerism over-
powers all other concerns.225
Whether ethical consumerism is losing its momentum or
not, information is a big problem in attracting customers to Fair
Trade products. 226 One of the main concerns is that information
from companies regarding their social policies tends to be misin-
Starbucks buys is Fair Trade coffee. Jake Batsell, Growers From Fair-Trade Co-op
Appeal to Starbucks' Taste Buds, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 29, 2001, at Business &
Technology available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/ (last visited Feb.
25, 2002). See also Walter, supra note 214 ("consumers' power to stay away makes
corporations change").
219. Franklin, supra note 13.
220. See supra text accompanying note 175. See also Collier, supra note 38
(stating that "any such solution would take place too far in the future to help the
people").
221. See supra text accompanying note 123.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 123-124. Cafedirect, a Fair Trade coffee
retailer, started by selling their coffee at church and community events but has since
entered into the mainstream coffee market and is a leading brand sold in most
stores. See also Donachy, supra note 216.
223. See Crilly, supra note 201. In a recent study by the Co-operative Bank,
eighty-eight percent of shoppers claim to buy products with ethics in mind, only
twenty-three percent could name a specific instance of such conduct. Id.
224. Id. (citing one of the authors of the Co-operative Bank study as stating
that, "The enthusiasm of the early 90s seems to have leaked away and the most pes-
simistic interpretation of these figures is that ethical consumerism is just a tempo-
rary trend which is already sliding out of fashion."). See also Walter, supra note 214
(stating that, "Apparently consumers are tired of getting 'hectoring messages.'").
The only kind of "ethical" consumerism that people actually buy into is organic food
because consumers like the fact that it benefits themselves. Id.
225. Walter, supra note 214.
226. Crilly, supra note 201. See also Natasha Walter, Where Are the Ethical
Consumers?, THE INDEP. (London), Oct. 16, 2000, at 5 ("Most people [in the survey]
said that they just didn't have the information to make judgments on a company's
behaviour.").
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formation.227 A number of corporations have made changes that
are only cosmetic. 228 Untrue claims made by corporations serve
to undermine the entire ethical consumerism ideal because they
make customers believe there is no essential difference between
products claimed to be "ethical" and their counterparts. 229 Con-
sumers will then stop paying higher prices for ethical products
and switch to cheaper products. 230 A second problem is that not
enough easily accessible consumer information is available.231
Most consumers have no knowledge that the Fair Trade market
exists, 232 which gives them no incentive to pay the higher prices
for fairly traded products. This situation is somewhat amelio-
rated by the fact that Fair Trade coffee is distinguished by "eas-
ily-identifiable labelling [sic] ,"233 but the labeling cannot target a
consumer unless the consumer is aware of the label's existence
and knows what the label represents.
A final problem with Fair Trade as a consumer movement is
the question of whether labeling undertaken by Fair Trade or-
ganizations is legal under the rules of the World Trade Organi-
zation.234 The rule in question prohibits products from being la-
beled and thereby differentiated on the basis of how they are
produced. 235 However, a GATT panel has since decided that
227. Id.
228. Kevin Watkins, Green Dream Turns Turtle Environment: Fair Trade Pro-
duce Is Increasingly Fashionable, With New Lines Launched Each Week, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 9,1998, at Guardian Society Page, available at 1998 WL 18664532.
229. See Watkins, supra note 226 ("It is not just the gap between corporate pub-
lic relations and market practices which is undermining ethical consumerism."). See
also Mitchell, supra note 122 (citing a commodities analyst who stated, -I am not
persuaded that the average consumer going into a shop or a restaurant is really go-
ing to make a distinction' as to whether the coffee is fair-trade certified.").
230. See supra text accompanying note 214.
231. Crilly, supra note 201. To sift through all the information available to
consumers regarding products they buy, a person would need both time and money.
Most consumers do not have the inclination, and therefore do not bother to put in
the effort required to sort through all of the information. Id.
232. Groos, supra note 118, at 381. In contrast to the slow spread of consumer
awareness in the United States, "Surveys indicate that '86% of consumers in the
United Kingdom said they were now aware of fair trade labeled products'... the
statistics for Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium are similar." Id. at 402.
233. Crilly, supra note 201 ("The ultimate ethical consumer wouldn't buy any-
thing. Instead we are talking about consumers who are more ethical than others...
and products that are more ethical than others.") Fair Trade labels are protected by
intellectual property so that retailers cannot use the label unless they have been cer-
tified by the organization that possesses the label. Groos, supra note 118, at 406.
Therefore, consumers have the assurance that the product was produced in an ethi-
cal manner. Id.
234. Watkins, supra note 228.
235. Id.
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voluntary adoption of labels that are based on ethical consumer-
ism is not a violation of the rule.236
For these reasons, Fair Trade as a consumer movement,
within the free trade framework, is not a viable solution. Fair
Trade is unable to solve the imminent problems facing farmers,
such as starvation and homelessness, fast enough. Not enough
truthful information has been promulgated regarding Fair
Trade to alert consumers, who could increase demand to allevi-
ate the problem. If anything, there might even be a decrease in
consumer patronage of Fair Trade products. Moreover, the
whole Fair Trade scheme may be illegal. Consequently, the free
market idea of allowing consumers to solve the social problems
confronting coffee farmers by selecting products through ethical
consumerism is not going to solve the present market crisis.
4. Politics and the Coffee Market
As stated earlier, economic theory under a free trade regime
assumes that when there is a drop in market price, producers
will discontinue supply. 237 Unfortunately, economic theory does
not address theft, political turmoil in countries, and the produc-
tion of illicit goods that can result from both a decrease in price
and supply.238 In the coffee market, a market stabilizer is
needed to prevent farmers from turning to socially harmful ac-
tivities when coffee prices are low.
In past months, groups of armed rebels have re-formed and
started a campaign of harassment in coffee growing areas. 239
These rebels have also been protesting the injustices resulting
from the coffee industry.240 Agreements signed between guerril-
las and coffee producing governments are becoming shaky.241
History shows that civil unrest also resulted from the last price
crash in the early 1990's causing farmers to join Zapatista re-
bels in Chiapas and contributing to the Hutu massacres of the
Tutsis in Rwanda. 242 Extremely low coffee prices create chaos
236. Groos, supra note 118, at 408.
237. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
238. See Collier, supra note 38.
239. Rebels have been "holding up buses and trucks and making speeches about
injustice." Id.
240. Id.
241. There is fear that the plunge in the price of coffee could quash Guatemala's
1996 peace agreement ending Guatemala's civil war against guerrillas. Id.
242. Id.
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and instability in underdeveloped coffee producing countries. 243
The U.S. government has previously recognized that this state
of civil unrest is not in its best interest.244
The United States initially signed an International Coffee
Agreement with producing countries to prevent the spread of
communism if decreased coffee prices caused market failures in
underdeveloped countries. 245 This shows that the United States
previously recognized the problem of instability in developing
countries when coffee prices fall.246 The United States implicitly
acknowledged that free trade did not fix the problem, but in-
stead, restrictions on trade were needed to prevent political
problems associated with decreases in coffee prices.247
Illicit activity has also resulted from a steep fall in coffee
prices.248 Officials in coffee producing areas have reported an
increase in theft, specifically of items such as baby bottles, pow-
dered milk, and food.249 There is also growing concern that cof-
fee farmers in Colombia will find new work in the drug market,
working on coca plantations and in cocaine laboratories. 20 Like
economists have suggested, coffee growers have found an alter-
native to producing coffee, 251 although this alternative is not in
the best interest of society as a whole. Because the free market
leads to such negative social effects, the best interests of coun-
tries are met when there is some market stabilizer that pre-
vents the steep drop in the price of coffee.
B. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AS A SOLUTION
As history has shown, in order to be effective, any quota
system put in place in the coffee industry must be established
between a number of countries, rather than implemented by a
single country.25 2 Moreover, producing and consuming countries
must be a part of any agreement to ensure enforcement of re-
243. Collier, supra note 38.
244. See id.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70. A steep fall in the price of coffee
can cause the economies of coffee dependent nations to collapse. Foli, supra note 21.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
247. See id.
248. Collier, supra note 38. See also Neuffer, supra note 1.
249. Collier, supra note 38.
250. Id. Thousands of coffee workers that cannot get money for their crops are
flooding into the southern jungles of Colombia to find work in the cocaine industry in
order to support themselves. Id.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 5 and 11.
252. See supra text accompanying note 80-86, 96.
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strictions on trade. 253 Therefore, the only possible solution
would be an international agreement between producing and
consuming nations like the aforementioned International Coffee
Agreements. 254
Some commentators have suggested that what is needed to
perk up the coffee market is a New Deal type agreement that
would ensure that farmers get a fair price for their coffee.255
This agreement would need to artificially reduce the supply of
coffee in order to raise and stabilize prices. 256 Unfortunately,
farmers would feel the effects of such an agreement too far in
the future for the agreement to deal with the hardships coffee
farmers now face. 25 7 An international agreement may be a long
term goal, but right now the concern should be about ensuring
that farmers and their families have enough food to eat.
A second concern about an international agreement be-
tween producing and consuming countries is that any agree-
ment between these countries is highly unlikely. The United
States has already issued a formal statement to the effect that
international coffee agreements are contrary to the tenets of free
trade and therefore against U.S. foreign policy. 258 An agreement
would also be unlikely because of the probable failure of con-
suming and producing countries to agree on the terms of such
an agreement. The quota structure of the previous Interna-
tional Coffee Agreements has been very problematic. 259
253. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98, 87-89, 92-95. Successful agree-
ments have been seen between producing countries for other commodities such as
the oil industry by the formation of the Organization of Oil Producing Countries
(OPEC). See Quill, supra note 28, at 509. The coffee market is unlike oil in four es-
sential ways that prevents an agreement between producers from working: 1) stabi-
lization of the supply of coffee is more difficult in the short run due to the time lag of
tree growth, 2) corporations in developed countries maintain stockpiles of coffee, 3)
there are too many producing countries to have effective enforcement of agreements,
4) there are substitutes for coffee. Id.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 65-75.
255. Collier, supra note 38 (citing the president of the Institute for Agriculture
and Trade Policy in Minneapolis, "What's needed is a new version of producer-
consumer price agreements, a 'global Roosevelt New Deal to ensure that farmers get
a fair price and have a level playing field.'").
256. Foli, supra note 21, at 101 ("Over the long term, the only way to effectively
maintain a target price above the free market level is to artificially reduce long term
aggregate coffee exports through a persistent storage of coffee stocks or a decrease in
overall production."). Quotas stop the fluctuation of prices in the market by keeping
supply constant. Id. at 99.
257. Collier, supra note 38.
258. See supra text accompanying note 75.
259. See Foli, supra note 21, at 92. The 1983 Agreement had both a fixed and a
variable quota component. Id. at 91. The variable quota encouraged producers to
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A final concern about using international agreements as a
solution is whether these agreements actually work to stabilize
prices on a long term basis.260 History has shown that none of
the previous International Coffee Agreements were able to sta-
bilize prices in the long term.261 There have also been concerns
that producers use agreements solely as a means of increasing
oligopoly or monopoly profits through artificial prices.262 The
agreements do not state that they intend to raise prices above
free market levels, but the question remains open whether pre-
vious agreements had this effect. 263
Therefore, another International Coffee Agreement does not
seem to be the solution, most importantly because all previous
international coffee agreements failed.264 In the short term, an
agreement involving producers and consumers would not solve
the present situation of coffee growers and the question remains
whether such an agreement would be viable as a long term solu-
tion.
C. FAIR TRADE ON THE GLOBAL SCALE AS A SHORT TERM SO-
LUTION
1. The Fair Trade Program Globally
Another potential solution is to enforce the Fair Trade pro-
gram globally, requiring every coffee company in developed
countries to pay producers an agreed upon minimum price per
pound of coffee that would act as a "living wage" for farmers. 265
Every small grower would be grouped into a cooperative, pref-
increase production, and because they could not sell this to member consuming
countries, they sold the excess to nonmember countries at a discount. Id. at 92.
This upset U.S. coffee companies who wanted to see an end to the two-tiered pricing
system. Id. A second problem was that the quota system failed to differentiate be-
tween traditional and gourmet beans leading to an inadequate supply of gourmet
beans. Id. The United States then insisted that any new agreement use a universal
quota system. Id. at 93.
260. Foli, supra note 21, at 102 ("Continued reliance upon export quotas or ex-
port retention plans to stabilize market prices, however, has been unsuccessful in
the past.").
261. Id. at 80.
262. Id. at 100 ("Producers can rationally be expected to artificially inflate coffee
prices to maximize monopoly profits.").
263. Id.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 65-75; see also Foli, supra note 21, at
102.
265. See supra text accompanying note 121.
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erably with farmers selling a similar grade of coffee, which
would bypass the "coyote" and deal directly with the company
purchasing the coffee. 266  Long term relationships between
growers and buyers will be established, making buyers more
willing to give farmers advanced credit on their harvest.267
Creditors in general will also be more willing to extend credit to
coffee farmers in underdeveloped countries because of an assur-
ance that the price paid to farmers will remain stable. 268 This
solution could ultimately be short term if, based on the contacts
and long term relationships farmers have established with cof-
fee companies, they can continuously negotiate a profitable price
per pound of coffee.
In exchange for this minimum price per pound of coffee,
farmers would reinvest part of their profits back into the coop-
erative to support the infrastructure and projects in the com-
munity.269 This would minimize the amount of monetary aid the
United States would expend on coffee producing underdeveloped
countries. 270 Small communities, in the form of cooperatives,
would be in possession of the "aid" from developed countries,
which would allow them to implement the programs that are
most needed.271 "Aid" would go to those that need the money
most rather than to the governments of underdeveloped coun-
tries, where there is some question as to how the money is in
fact used. 27 2 Under this system, there is not an absolute wealth
transfer, but instead, developing countries are learning to com-
266. See supra text accompanying notes 129-131.
267. See supra text accompanying note 135.
268. See supra text accompanying note 179.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 137-142.
270. Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order,
14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 369 (1994) ("the fact remains that adjustment of the trade
relationship between North and South could in principle obviate any need for foreign
aid"). The United States spent $7.4 billion in foreign aid in 1995. See also Tim
Shorrock, Drop in US Foreign Aid Seen Dulling Export Edge, J. OF COM., July 23,
1997, at 2A.
271. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. See also Fair Trade and Ethi-
cal Trade: Distinct But Complementary, IFAT at http://www.ifat.org/dwr/ re-
source2.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2002) ("Fair trade's fundamental objective is to
increase the incomes of disadvantaged communities, thereby increasing the range of
choices available to them in relation to food, education, welfare, and work").
272. See Doug Bandow, Foreign Aid Does Not Prevent Social Breakdown. (Fail-
ure of Financial Aid Policies in the United States), USA TODAY (mag.), Mar. 1998, at
http://www.findarticles.com/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2002). U.S. foreign aid has been
used to fund brutal dictators and inefficient programs in underdeveloped countries.
Id. But most alarmingly, funds have been given to corrupt governments, causing
their complete disappearance. Id.
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pete in the global market and are given the means to do so. 273
Farmers under the Fair Trade system would also be ex-
pected to farm in an environmentally friendly manner.27 4 At
present, weak international environmental standards exist that
are hard to police. 275 Any environmental restrictions actually
come from trade agreements themselves.27 6 Countries with
strong environmental regulations have started requiring coun-
tries with weaker environmental regulations to meet their stan-
dards before any trade between the countries occurs.277 The en-
vironmental requirements of the Fair Trade system are to some
extent a continuation of that practice, but producers under the
Fair Trade system are being rewarded for their efforts with an
increased price. Farmers under Fair Trade actually have the
ability to engage in environmentally friendly practices because
they have the money to do so. 278
The U.S. government is unlikely to adopt Fair Trade as a
solution because it has a detrimental effect on free trade,279 but
the price aspect of the Fair Trade solution closely resembles the
U.S. policy for the U.S. agricultural market.280 In the face of in-
stability and a steady decline in agricultural prices,281 the
United States adopted a program where small farmers were as-
sured a minimum price for their crops and credit was made
available to farmers using their present crop as collateral. 282
The United States funds this program by taxing the U.S. pub-
lic. 283 Therefore, funds are in effect being redistributed from the
wealthier taxpayer to the poorer small farmer.
273. See Brown, supra note 270, at 369. See also Paul Craig Roberts, Rescuing
Poor Countries From Foreign Aid, THE FIN. POST (Toronto), Mar. 8, 1989, § 1, at 11
(The Agency for International Development made the comment that, "too often, de-
pendency has won out over development." Entire developing countries are being
converted into a welfare class).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 143-144. At present, the World Bank
requires that certain environmental conditions be met before underdeveloped coun-
tries are allowed to borrow money. Brown, supra note 270, at 380.
275. Id. at 382.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See supra text accompanying note 144.
279. See supra text accompanying note 75. See also Groos, supra note 118, at
409 ("Certainly from a legal perspective, seemingly radical positions on trade are not
likely to transform themselves into legislation, international agreements, or poli-
cies.").
280. See supra text accompanying note 101.
281. See supra text accompanying note 116.
282. See supra text accompanying note 101.
283. See supra text accompanying note 108.
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If developing countries had the funds with which to imple-
ment such a program, they probably would happily subsidize
their local growers. 28 4 Because developing countries lack the re-
sources, this program needs to be implemented on a broader
scale to prevent farmers in developing countries from starving
when there is a steep drop in the price of coffee. Consumers in
developed countries would essentially be asked to pay a "tax" on
their coffee in order to support small farmers in developing
countries, which consumers in most countries are already asked
to do for other agricultural products. 2 5 Although the aims of
the subsidization would be different because very little political
power can be gained through a strong coffee trade,2 6 the effects
of the U.S. agricultural program and the Fair Trade program
would be nearly identical.
2. Evaluation of Fair Trade as a Global Program
The main concern if a Fair Trade system were implemented
globally would be a further increase in the supply of coffee due
to the inflated price.28 7 To solve this problem, any global Fair
Trade program should be implemented as a short term policy
only. In the short term, farmers should be able to acquire the
financial management skills necessary to compete globally and
acquire enough resources through their cooperatives to allow for
alternatives to the coffee industry when the market is bad. The
goals of the Fair Trade program are to teach small coffee grow-
ers business savvy28 8 and to organize the market in such a way
that small growers can compete on a global scale, without being
taken advantage of by "coyotes."28 9 Fair Trade programs have
the additional beneficial effect of supplying cooperatives with
the money necessary to invest in infrastructure and education
in the cooperative's community.290 Technology, education, and
capital would become available to small farmers, so they would
not face the utter lack of alternatives that have driven many to
284. See supra text accompanying note 109.
285. See supra text accompanying note 101.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 111-113. The coffee industry does not
have as great an effect on industrialized economies as the oil industry does. Quill,
supra note 28, at 522. Coffee could be eliminated from the present economy. Id.
287. See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 164, at 78-79 (this phenomenon is
known as a price floor).
288. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 129-136.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 138-139, 141-142.
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camp on roads and in parks during the current plunge in the
coffee price.291 Even though the Fair Trade program would only
be implemented for a short duration, the beneficial effects gen-
erated from the program will hopefully last in the long term. If
the amount of supply does increase disproportionately to de-
mand, quotas on production could be implemented and adher-
ence monitored on a per cooperative basis.
Another concern is that, with an increase in the price paid
to the grower by the coffee companies, there will be a corre-
sponding increase in the price paid by consumers that will de-
crease demand for coffee.292 A decrease in demand for coffee
would thereby magnify the effects of the current oversupply.
This suggestion ignores the fact that demand for coffee is rela-
tively inelastic. 293 Only at extremely high price levels will there
be a decrease in demand for coffee. 294 If the increase in price to
the consumer coincides with a reasonable increase in price paid
to the Fair Trade grower, this added cost to consumers should
not decrease demand. 295 But, if oligopolistic coffee companies
substantially increase the price at a rate that will compensate
them for their lost profits, there is a greater likelihood that de-
mand will decrease. 296 To solve this problem, the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission should look into pos-
sible antitrust violations committed by coffee companies against
U.S. consumers.
The cost of implementing the Fair Trade program and en-
forcing the requirements on both coffee companies and coopera-
tives may also be problematic. Within the present Fair Trade
scheme, certifying agents are sent out by TransFair USA to in-
spect cooperatives and educate them, teaching them how to im-
plement the Fair Trade program. 297 Because the goal of any
global Fair Trade program would be to increase profits to grow-
ers,298 placing the expense of enforcement on their shoulders is
not logical. Therefore, if non-profit organizations, such as
291. See supra text accompanying notes 173-175.
292. See GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 164, at 58.
293. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
295. See PIETERSE & SILVIS, supra note 22, at 33. It should be noted that other
factors besides the cost of coffee beans contributes to an increase in the price of cof-
fee to the consumer. Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10, at 3.
296. See PIETERSE & SILVIS supra note 22, at 33.
297. See Fair Trade, supra note 50.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 119, 121, 126-128.
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Transfair, 99 do not certify growers, then coffee-consuming coun-
tries should bear the responsibility. If aid is being discontinued
to coffee producing developing countries,300 then a small portion
of this money could be used to pay for certification agents.
These agents would visit coffee cooperatives to guarantee funds
are being used for community projects, environmental standards
are being met, and growers are receiving the correct price for
their coffee.
A related problem is that the cost of implementation of Fair
Trade to developed countries 30 1 and to coffee companies 3 2 will
pose a political barrier to a global Fair Trade program. Large
coffee companies would likely lobby governments to prevent the
passage of legislation instituting a Fair Trade program, because
the companies would not voluntarily agree to lose profits. How-
ever, coffee companies do have the incentive of instituting some
form of a price stabilization mechanism because they have an
interest in protecting the supply chain.30 3 Moreover, hopefully
there would be a countervailing group of civil rights activists
and taxpayers of equal proportion to the coffee company's lobby-
ing group. History has shown that a group of protesters,
through boycotts, was able to force Starbucks, a large retailer, to
sell Fair Trade coffee. 30 4 Groups already in existence such as
those that address sweatshops, globalization, and the environ-
ment would be expected supporters of a Fair Trade program. 30 5
In addition, if taxpayers knew that they could pay less for a Fair
Trade program than they are paying now to aid developing
countries, large scale support could be attained for a Fair Trade
program. 30 6
A final concern is that a global Fair Trade program de-
signed to assist small farmers will not be beneficial to all farms.
The two main categories of farmers that will have difficulties be-
ing included in the program are larger coffee plantations30 and
299. Fair Trade, supra note 50.
300. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 298-299.
302. See supra text accompanying note 295.
303. See Mathiason & Tooher, supra note 10, at 3.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 122, 218-219. See also Franklin, supra
note 13 (Starbucks is the "world's largest retailer of specialty coffee."). See also
Mitchell, supra note 122 (Starbucks is the "biggest gourmet coffee company to sign a
fair-trade agreement with TransFair.").
305. See Sarah Tomlinson, Group's Goal: Fair Price for Coffee, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, May 20, 2001 (City Weekly 8).
306. See Brown, supra note 270 at 369; see also Shorrock, supra note 270, at 2A.
307. See Mitchell, supra note 122.
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gourmet coffee growers. 308 Pickers from larger coffee planta-
tions are not directly benefited by the increase in the price paid
for coffee through a Fair Trade system, but they should be indi-
rectly benefited. If a plantation owner receives an increased
price for coffee, a portion of this increased profit should be
passed along to the picker. If pickers do not benefit from the in-
crease in profit, then a minimum wage could be implemented
and enforced by certifying agents.
Gourmet growers should also not have a problem in the
global Fair Trade system. Even though gourmet growers are
unable to join a cooperative with growers that grow a lower
grade of coffee,30 9 they still should be able to combine to form a
cooperative group specifically for gourmet growers. An example
of a gourmet coffee cooperative that has existed for seventy
years is the Colombian Coffee Federation.3 10 Like Fair Trade
cooperatives, the Colombian Coffee Federation guarantees a
minimum price to members and reinvests profits in infrastruc-
ture.311
CONCLUSION
The price paid to coffee growers for a pound of coffee in re-
cent years has continued to plunge to. the point where growers
find it economically disadvantageous to harvest their crops.
With no income from their crops, these growers are forced to set
up camps on roadsides and in parks to beg for food. The devel-
oping countries in which most of these growers are found do not
have the economic resources to either subsidize their coffee
growers or find them other means of sustaining themselves.
The present low price for coffee is largely due to instability in
the coffee market caused by inelasticity of supply and demand
in the short run. Moreover, coffee growers see very little of the
actual price paid for coffee because middlemen or "coyotes" price
gouge small growers.
Many solutions have been advanced to solve the present
problems in the coffee market. The solution endorsed by the
United States is to allow free market forces to solve the prob-
lems in the industry. This approach has proven unable to stabi-
lize prices and fix the structure of the market. A new Interna-
308. See supra text accompanying notes 156-157.
309. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
310. See Mitchell, supra note 122.
311. Id.
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tional Coffee Agreement is also a possible solution, but the ef-
fects of such an agreement would be realized too far in the fu-
ture to help growers in the present crisis. The most plausible
solution to the coffee crisis is a short term global Fair Trade
program patterned on the present grassroots movement. The
Fair Trade program ensures that growers receive a minimum
"living wage" price for their coffee and puts them in direct con-
tact with buyers. Growers would be required to use a portion of
these earnings toward community, infrastructure, education,
and the environment, thereby reducing the amount of aid devel-
oped countries must provide to developing countries. If enough
information could be disseminated to voters regarding the bene-
fits of a Fair Trade program, Fair Trade could be the answer to
the present coffee market crisis.
